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THE GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICE WORK: 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CALL CENTERS 
INTRODUCTION TO A SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL & LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
ROSEMARY BATT, DAVID HOLMAN, and URSULA HOLTGREWE* 
This introduction to the special issue on the globalization of service work provides 
an overview of the call center sector and its development in coordinated, liberal mar 
ket, and emerging market economies. The introduction's authors situate this research 
in literature on the comparative political economy and industrial relations. Drawing 
on qualitative research and a unique survey of 2,500 establishments in 17 countries 
conducted in 2003-2006, they discuss the extent of convergence and divergence in 
management practices and employment relations. They also describe the research 
methodology for the overall research project, highlight its major findings, and sum 
marize the contributions of the thematic papers covering several topics: unions' role 
in shaping the quality of jobs; the factors that influence wage levels and wage inequal 
ity; the uses of contingent employment and their outcomes; the relationships among 
strategic human resource management, work design, and organizational outcomes; 
and the relationships among technology, selection, and training. 
TP he globalization of service work has 
*- drawn the attention of both research 
ers and the media in recent years. While 
international trade in services is not new, it 
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intensified in the late 1990s in the wake of 
deregulation of service industries, market 
liberalization spurred by the General Agree 
ment on Trade in Services, and advances in 
digitization. This process of globalization 
has been contentious: it has offered op 
portunities for economic growth for some 
while putting downward pressure on wages 
and employment levels for a growing swath 
of skilled and semi-skilled occupations in 
advanced economies (Blinder 2006). 
A data appendix with additional results, and copies 
of the computer programs used to generate the results 
presented in the paper, are available from the first author 
at NYSSILR, 395 Ives Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
NY 14853; e-mail rb41@Cornell.edu. Requests for data 
specific to a particular article in this symposium should 
be directed to the corresponding authors. 
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This special issue of the Industrial & 
Labor Relations Review is concerned with the 
globalization of service activities that rely 
on advances in information technologies. 
Specifically, we focus on the emerging call 
center sector?a set of organizations that 
manage customer service and sales transac 
tions across a wide range of product markets 
and industries. These operations are repre 
sentative of what is new in the globalization 
of service work. They are located in many 
parts of the world, offer remote service via 
technology, and are displacing establishments 
that provided placed-based service in local 
or protected markets. In addition, because 
call centers require relatively little capital 
investment, they may be easily relocated 
from one place to another in response to 
economic or political challenges. Thus, 
they are emblematic of the uncertainties 
created by globalization. In this context, 
we examine the meaning of globalization: 
how widespread is global competition and 
to what extent do we observe a convergence 
toward similar models of management and 
employment relations? 
The research in this volume extends the 
literature on comparative political economy 
and industrial relations. We are interested 
in how national institutions and historical 
legacies or path dependence shape distinct 
approaches to management and employ 
ment practices within and across countries 
in new economy service activities. We also 
draw on the insights from organization and 
management research that has traced the 
activities of leading multinational corpora 
tions in restructuring their operations and 
developing networked approaches to pro 
duction (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994) 
or off-shoring of service work (Dossani and 
Kenney 2003). This perspective provides 
insights into how these actors, operating 
in an increasingly unconstrained market 
space, learn from one another and spread 
management practices and innovations across 
international boundaries. 
In drawing on these literatures, we 
con 
sider the relative importance of different 
institutional rules and employer strategies 
in shaping the employment systems of new 
service activities. How do institutions and 
employer behaviors interact to produce dif 
ferent outcomes within and across countries? 
Do patterns in new service activities resemble 
those found in past studies based primarily 
on the experience of manufacturing? On 
the one hand, we bring a comparative institu 
tional perspective to the study of globalization 
in services. For example, rather than view 
Indian call centers as a unique case, as they 
are often portrayed (Bain and Taylor 2008; 
Poster 2007), we situate them in the more 
general context of the explosive growth of call 
centers in most countries around the world 
over the past decade. The Indian story has 
many unique features, but it is one of many 
national stories. On the other hand, we bring 
the study of global service work to the field 
of comparative employment systems. That 
literature has drawn almost entirely on the 
experience of a shrinking core of manufactur 
ing industries with deep institutional legacies 
(Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986; Streeck 
1991; Thelen 1991, 2005; Turner 1991) or, 
occasionally, service industries such as bank 
ing and telecommunications with a history 
of regulation and unionization (Katz 1997; 
Locke, Kochan, and Piore 1995; Regini et al. 
1999). How resilient are institutional legacies 
of more recent vintage, in sectors with low 
union coverage, in semi-skilled jobs where 
occupational training systems are undevel 
oped, and among lower-skilled or minority 
and female workers with weaker attachment 
to the labor market? Under what conditions 
do old institutions influence new economic 
activities that emerge outside of traditional 
boundaries? 
Also, following a long tradition in compara 
tive industrial relations, we take a sectoral 
approach because industries 
are the nexus 
of competitive interaction among firms and 
establishments, with actors developing spe 
cific products, services, and technologies 
that shape the demand for labor and the 
approach to work practices and labor rela 
tions. The strategic choices of actors, in turn, 
create customary practices and institutional 
legacies (Doeringer and Piore 1971) that 
shape the opportunities and constraints for 
future behavior. 
We focus on call centers because they are 
new production units, or business functions, 
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that are taking on the features of an emerg 
ing sector. Governments in advanced and 
emerging market economies alike view them 
as a source of employment and economic 
development. They are a large and growing 
sector in many countries. The tasks they 
fulfill?customer service, sales, and techni 
cal assistance?are ones that historically 
provided good jobs in advanced economies. 
These jobs were filled by insurance agents 
and claims adjusters in local businesses, 
tellers and service representatives at branch 
banks, order clerks at telephone companies, 
or technicians in field offices?all working 
in relatively protected labor markets, serving 
a variety of local customers in face-to-face 
interactions that required considerable 
independent judgment and interpersonal 
skills. They provided decent incomes and 
stable employment for a largely female work 
force; and where unionized, they provided 
high relative wages and middle-class stability 
(Batt 2001). However, unions now find it 
particularly difficult to organize workers in 
these footloose operations (Frost and Camp 
bell 1997; Holtgrewe, Kerst, and Shire 2002; 
Doellgast, Batt, and S0rensen, forthcoming). 
Thus, a central question is whether they will 
yield jobs with decent wages, good working 
conditions, and employment stability in the 
global economy. 
Call centers also are problematic for firms 
and consumers. Most companies remain 
uncertain about how to position these op 
erations. Initially viewing these centers as 
a means to reduce costs and create scale 
economies in service and sales channels, 
companies started out by adopting cost 
minimization strategies, except where gain 
ing customer acceptance and legitimacy for 
the new service took precedence (Holtgrewe 
and Kerst 2002). But these production line 
approaches to work organization led to classic 
managerial problems of low morale and high 
turnover and absenteeism (Holman 2002; 
Deery, Iverson, and Walsh 2002), creating 
poor management-employee relations as 
well as high levels of customer dissatisfaction. 
Consumer complaints about poor service 
quality have been widespread, leading com 
panies to continually amend their policies. 
Understanding the range of management 
practices and how they affect outcomes such 
as turnover, job and service quality, and wages 
is an important task for informing firm-level 
policy as well as public policy. 
From a theoretical perspective, this context 
offers a critical case for examining the conver 
gence-divergence debate. With few barriers 
to entry, small capital outlays, off-the-shelf 
technologies, a technology-vendor and con 
sulting industry that operates globally (Djelic 
and Quack 2003; Flecker 2007), and jobs 
that require modest formal education, call 
center operations should converge toward a 
universal system. Moreover, given that these 
operations are relatively low-value-added 
and subject to intense price competition, 
we would expect them to converge toward 
a low-skill, low-wage model of production 
and employment relations. If institutions 
matter in this case, then they should matter 
for a range of higher-skill and more complex 
service occupations. 
This special issue also offers some meth 
odological advances over past international 
studies. It is larger in scale, scope, and meth 
odological integration. Some 50 scholars 
in 17 countries participated in a multi-year 
collaboration, which has since expanded to 
include Japan and China. The countries 
represented in the study are emerging market 
economies as well as advanced economies; 
and each country team utilized a similar 
methodology and establishment-level sur 
vey. The resulting international database, 
which forms the basis for the articles in this 
issue, includes information on almost 2,500 
establishments. Researchers also conducted 
extensive field research to complement the 
surveys and provide the institutional material 
to help inform and interpret the quantita 
tive results. 
In addition, unlike many comparative 
volumes that provide country-by-country 
analyses, our approach is thematic, with each 
article providing a cross-national analysis 
focusing on a particular theme. Articles 
in this issue consider the role of unions in 
shaping the quality of jobs; the factors that 
influence wage levels and wage inequality; 
cross-national similarities and differences in 
the use of contingent work arrangements; 
the relationships among strategic human 
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resource management, work design, and 
organizational outcomes; and whether tech 
nology, selection, and training are comple 
ments or substitutes in call center operations 
across countries. 
Comparative Institutional Perspectives 
The current debate on convergence and 
divergence in economic systems draws on 
several decades of research in comparative 
political economy and sociology (Berger and 
Dore 1996; Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall 
and Soskice 2000; Djelic and Quack 2003; 
Herrigel 2005; Bosch and Lehndorff 2005; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005) and industrial 
relations (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, and My 
ers 1964; Locke, Kochan, and Piore 1995; 
Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000; Waddington 
2005). The debate considers whether the 
expansion of international activity will lead 
to convergent or divergent management 
practices and employment relations. 
Various perspectives on the debate have 
emerged. Convergence theorists argue that 
firms will converge toward best practice, as 
markets weed out those with less competitive 
strategies. They echo the functionalist argu 
ments of Kerr et al. (1964), who believed that 
firms around the world would adopt a set of 
best practices, driven by advances in science 
and technology. Theorists of divergence 
emphasize that different logics of economic 
behavior exist because they are historically 
embedded and path dependent. Some have 
attempted to reconcile these arguments 
with the idea that both forces are at play at 
different levels, giving rise to the notion of 
convergent divergences (Katz and Darbishire 
2000). Finally, some skeptics argue that na 
tional systems vary to such an extent that the 
question of convergence 
versus divergence 
is not the most relevant question to consider 
(Whitley 1999). 
The literature on varieties of capitalism 
brings together a large body of research on 
why divergent strategies are likely to continue 
(Jackson and Deeg 2006). National systems 
have distinct configurations of capital, labor, 
and product market institutions and welfare 
states that, taken together, provide economic 
actors with different opportunities and 
con 
straints, or different institutional resources 
(Thelen and Streeck 2005), for competing in 
global markets. In this issue, we focus primar 
ily on how labor market institutions influence 
management and employment practices. 
This is consistent with much of the varieties 
of capitalism literature, which has viewed 
labor market institutions, work organization, 
and labor-management relations as central 
to defining the character of national systems 
(Maurice, Sellier, and Silvestre 1986; Thelen 
1991; Streeck 1991; Boyer 1997; Thelen and 
Streeck 2005; Crouch 2005). 
The most parsimonious theoretical 
framework differentiates coordinated from 
liberal market economies based on how they 
organize economic action (Hall and Soskice 
2001). We begin with that framework in this 
volume because it has "a distinct advantage 
in testing hypotheses with the use of statisti 
cal models" (Jackson and Deeg 2006:32). 
Whereas liberal market economies, such 
as Canada, the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Ireland, rely primarily on 
markets and prices to govern economic ac 
tivity, coordinated economies such as those 
in continental Europe and Scandinavia rely 
more on political processes of negotiation, 
persuasion, and consensus building. In 
theory, these represent different logics of 
action rather than a continuum of behav 
ior, with actors in liberal economies relying 
primarily on firm strategies and managerial 
prerogative to control work force effort, 
and coordinated economies drawing more 
on the collective activities of employer and 
labor associations to gain labor stability and 
cooperation. 
While most institutional theorists generally 
agree on which countries fit the liberal market 
category, they differ on how to define coor 
dinated economies. Some, such as Whitley 
(1999), Amable (2003), and Crouch (2005), 
argue that the dichotomous framework of 
Hall and Soskice is too simplistic, and favor 
more differentiated typologies. Differences 
among coordinated economies may lead to 
meaningful differences in outcomes; and 
as 
market liberalization has intensified competi 
tive pressures on firms, they have pushed to 
loosen market regulations in different ways, 
depending on nationally specific economic 
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conditions, institutions, and power rela 
tionships. For example, while research 
has demonstrated an overall trend toward 
decentralization in bargaining systems (Katz 
and Darbishire 2000), the ways employers 
and unions have restructured national sys 
tems differ markedly among coordinated 
economies in the EU. These systems vary 
in union density, the relative importance 
of industry- and firm-level bargaining, the 
role of works councils at the firm and estab 
lishment levels, and the extent of reliance 
on mandatory or voluntary compliance 
mechanisms to extend bargaining cover 
age to employers who are not members of 
employers associations. 
Compared to Denmark, France, and 
Austria, for example, the German industrial 
relations system has undergone consider 
able fragmentation in recent decades, with 
declines in bargaining coverage, union 
density, and employer compliance with in 
dustry agreements (Yamamura and Streeck 
2003; Patterson and Green 2005; Bosch and 
Weinkopf 2008; Caroli and Gautie 2008; 
Westergaard-Nielsen 2008). These "small" 
differences should lead to meaningfully dif 
ferent employment systems and outcomes 
among coordinated economies, calling into 
question whether the overall category of 
"coordinated" is theoretically meaningful. 
Alternatively, the framework of coordi 
nated versus liberal economies may be able 
to accommodate theories of variation at lower 
levels of analysis. Research in comparative 
industrial relations, for example, has shown 
that while some overall similarities exist across 
coordinated economies in their reliance on 
bargaining among peak labor and employer 
associations to maintain economic stability, 
these countries also differ in the level of co 
ordinated bargaining and how it is achieved 
(Calmfors and Driffil 2002; OECD 2004). 
Under this scenario, we might expect to find 
overarching similarities among coordinated 
economies that distinguish them collectively 
from liberal market economies, with ad 
ditional variation explained at the national 
and sub-national level. 
The convergent divergences hypothesis 
accommodates this notion of layering at dif 
ferent levels of analysis (Katz and Darbishire 
2000). On the one hand, most countries 
have experienced some level of deunioniza 
tion, deregulation of labor markets, and 
decentralization in collective negotiations. 
Bargaining power has shifted to employers, 
creating more space for the role of strategic 
choice in organizations and allowing manag 
ers to borrow foreign work practices, such 
as lean production and performance-based 
pay. This diffusion of strategies has led to a 
convergence across countries in the "menu" 
or range of work and employment practices 
that employers adopt. It has created more 
differentiated systems of work and pay within 
countries because some employers may re 
tain traditional practices while others adopt 
new ones. Some workplaces may retain 
their union coverage and high relative pay 
and working conditions, while others may 
emerge outside of traditional industrial 
relations systems and offer lower pay and 
job quality. Similarly, some employers may 
compete on the basis of high value-added 
goods and a skilled work force, while others 
may pay low wages in order to compete based 
on low prices. 
On the other hand, because countries have 
different institutional legacies or "starting 
points," and different industrial relations sys 
tems, they vary in their ability to absorb new 
work practices from abroad; and even where 
they do absorb these practices, they transform 
them in the process. Lean production, for 
example, has quite different characteristics in 
Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Japan. 
Differences in the implementation of new 
work practices depend in part on the strength 
and bargaining rights of unions or works 
councils (Doellgast2008). Thus, differences 
in national systems lead to differences in 
the distribution and implementation of new 
employment practices and the magnitude of 
within-country inequality. 
This volume thus draws on the rich litera 
ture on varieties of capitalism and situates 
the emerging call center sector in the con 
text of current debates. However, a major 
limitation in this literature is its failure, to 
date, to include emerging market economies. 
There have been a few exceptions, including 
the work of Whitley (1999) and Orru, Big 
gart, and Guillen (Orru et al. 1997; Biggart 
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and Guillen 2002); but in general, existing 
research provides little guidance on how to 
conceptualize emerging markets in relation 
to coordinated or liberal market economies. 
Call centers in these economies, however, are 
competing with those in advanced econo 
mies, thus requiring a broader framework 
of comparative political economy to analyze 
similarities and differences across national 
economic systems. Emerging market econo 
mies do not fit neatly into a single category, 
as their geographic locations, cultures, and 
colonial histories are radically different. 
Yet, they share some similarities in labor 
market institutions and political economic 
conditions vis-a-vis the global economy. The 
emerging market economies in this study 
(Poland, Brazil, India, South Africa, South 
Korea) are characterized by a legacy of de 
centralized bargaining; a weak overall union 
movement, with some pockets of strength 
and militancy; economic crises that have 
undermined union strength; and on-going 
problems of unemployment and an infor 
mal economy that create highly segmented 
labor markets. These characteristics suggest 
that the industrial relations systems in these 
countries are unlikely to influence employer 
strategies in highly mobile, new sector activi 
ties such as call centers. 
The papers in this volume assess whether 
evidence from this sector supports the predic 
tions of the varieties of capitalism literature, 
while examining the evidence on emerging 
market economies from a more exploratory 
standpoint. We consider variation in employ 
ment practices and outcomes at different lev 
els of analysis: between coordinated, liberal 
market, and emerging market economies; 
among the countries in each of these groups; 
and within countries, based on variation in 
collective representation and employer busi 
ness and HR strategies. 
The Emerging Call Center Sector 
In taking a sectoral approach, we are able 
to compare "apples and apples" across coun 
tries?organizations that operate in a similar 
market space with a similar range of strategic 
choices in technologies and service offer 
ings (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck 
1994:13). Call centers represent an emerg 
ing sector because, while no clear industry 
boundaries exist, they compete against each 
other in a defined market space. The product 
market consists of managing service and sales 
transactions between provider firms and their 
customers. These firms also compete in the 
same or overlapping labor markets, employ 
ing semi-skilled workers with competencies 
in computer literacy, numeracy, and interper 
sonal communication (Batt2002). Thus, the 
choice of call centers allows us to offer some 
new insights into the debate on varieties of 
capitalism and address some critiques of the 
existing literature, such as its lack of attention 
to emerging market economies. The findings 
from call centers also may offer insights for 
other new economy service and high tech 
activities that have weak institutional legacies 
and that have emerged in the current period 
of heightened international competition. 
The sector also poses unique theoretical 
and methodological challenges, as these op 
erations have a more complex institutional 
legacy than that found in most industry stud 
ies. Most centers began as in-house opera 
tions serving the customers of their own firms. 
Many began as local service bureaus that 
were later consolidated into larger centers 
accessed via technology. Thus, each in-house 
center reflects the historic employment prac 
tices?and collective bargaining contracts, 
where they existed?of the particular firms 
and industries in which they are embedded. 
Call centers in banking, telecommunications, 
manufacturing, retail, utilities, publishing, 
and the public sector inherited features that 
distinguish them from one another in terms 
of, for example, the character of labor-man 
agement relations and collective bargaining, 
the level of complexity of technical systems, 
product features, the demand for skills, and 
the type of customer base served. 
However, the level of competition and 
space for strategic choice expanded in the 
1990s, as most countries undertook national 
deregulation of service industries such as 
banking, telecommunications, and utilities 
(Katz 1997; Regini et al. 1999). Since then, 
EU actions to harmonize regulation in these 
sectors and permit trade in services have 
further heightened competitive pressures 
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and organizational restructuring. At the 
same time, new call center technologies have 
provided opportunities and incentives to re 
structure and consolidate service operations 
in new ways. In addition, many service and 
sales interactions are easily separated into 
discrete tasks, making it possible to fragment 
jobs into those serving different custom 
ers, products, or service hours. Using call 
distribution systems and skill-based routing 
technologies, firms could create specialized 
units dedicated to particular products, ser 
vices, or customer segments. These market 
segmentation strategies increase the division 
of labor, allowing companies to achieve better 
scale economies and to set up differentiated 
job structures and pay hierarchies based on 
the value of products, services, or customer 
interactions. 
Research has shown, for example, that 
U.S. banks have differentiated centers both 
by customer segment and by product, with 
retail banking and credit card operations of 
fering lower-quality jobs and lower pay, and 
mortgage and insurance centers offering 
higher-quality jobs and higher pay (Hunter 
et al. 2001). Telecommunications firms, by 
contrast, have differentiated centers by cus 
tomer segment?mass market, small business, 
national business, and global accounts?with 
differentiatedjobs, skills, discretion, and pay 
(Batt 2000, 2001). 
Advances in call center technologies 
coupled with the decline in transmission 
costs also allowed employers a greater range 
of strategic choice in what work they kept 
in-house and what they outsourced to sub 
contractors or sent off-shore. Since the early 
1990s, subcontractors have grown rapidly 
to serve primary firms, as barriers to entry 
were low and off-the-shelf technology easy 
to acquire. These subcontractors created 
employment models from scratch, often 
relying on equipment vendors who provided 
state-of-the-art call center technologies and 
standard operating protocols, with cost 
driven employment strategies derivative of 
these operating systems. 
Whether firms use subcontractors as 
complements or substitutes for their in-house 
operations, however, is an open empirical 
question. Some research suggests that they 
primarily use subcontractors?whether 
domestic or off-shore?for the most trans 
actional work: outbound telemarketing, 
inbound calls for simple inquiries, credit 
card activation, reservation confirmations. 
For example, Batt, Doellgast, and Kwon 
(2006) found systematic differences in the 
quality and complexity of jobs, pay levels, 
and turnover between U.S. in-house centers, 
U.S. subcontractors, and Indian off-shore 
subcontractors. Firms are much more likely 
to retain in-house call center services for their 
business or higher value-added customers. In 
our fieldwork for this study, managers of mul 
tinational subcontracting firms complained 
that, while they wanted to provide higher 
value-added services, they were not getting 
that kind of business. Other research shows 
that employers have used subcontractors to 
complement the work of in-house centers 
by outsourcing overflow calls or calls during 
"unsocial" hours?during evenings or week 
ends (Arzbacher et al. 2002; Doellgast 2008; 
Hoist 2008). However, increasingly, some 
employers have created competitive contests 
between in-house centers and subcontrac 
tors at home as well as off-shore, with calls 
allocated to those that produce the highest 
volumes at the lowest costs (Doellgast and 
Greer 2007; Dunkel and Schonauer 2008). 
This "whipsawing" in effect treats in-house 
centers and subcontractors as substitutes, 
intensifying cost competition and putting 
downward pressure on wages andjob security. 
In sum, despite the fact that call center 
agents perform generally similar service 
and sales functions, the extent of variation 
in jobs, pay, and working conditions appears 
to be considerably greater than what would 
be found, for example, among production 
workers in particular manufacturing in 
dustries, the empirical base of most of the 
literature on industrial relations and variet 
ies of capitalism (for example, Thelen 1991; 
Turner 1991; Locke 1992). The institutional 
fragmentation found in call centers is similar 
to that found in other new service activities, 
such as IT services, software programming, 
business process consulting, new media work, 
web design, and other ancillary services that 
firms purchase from suppliers. 
How do the characteristics of this sector af 
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feet predictions relevant to the convergence 
divergence debate? While each of the em 
pirical papers in this volume presents a series 
of specific hypotheses, we can specify some 
overall predictions for the study as a whole. 
First, with respect to sources of convergence, 
we would expect the easy availability of similar 
technology coupled with the low barriers to 
entry to lead to considerable convergence in 
those parts of operations most influenced by 
technology, such as the design of work and 
level of standardization in call handling and 
performance metrics. 
Second, with respect to sources of diver 
gence across countries, we would expect 
national labor market institutions to affect 
other parts of the employment system, such 
as the level of education of the work force, 
the quality of work life, the level of pay disper 
sion, and the level of turnover. In addition, 
we would expect the level of union density 
and centralization in collective bargaining 
to be particularly important factors shaping 
the extent to which inequality in jobs and pay 
exists among call center workers. More cen 
tralized systems, with mandatory extensions 
of contracts or voluntary norms of compli 
ance, allow negotiated agreements to cover 
a broader swath of employers. This would 
suggest that differences between coordinated 
and liberal market economies would be no 
table; however, those coordinated economies 
that have experienced considerable decen 
tralization in bargaining systems are likely 
to resemble liberal market economies more 
than has been true in the past. ' 
Third, with respect to the mix of con 
vergent and divergent patterns, we would 
expect that even countries with mandatory 
or voluntary compliance mechanisms would 
find it difficult to influence the behavior 
of subcontractors, who operate outside of 
industry boundaries. Unions have found 
it difficult to organize call centers because 
these establishments maybe easily dismantled 
and moved, they make considerable 
use of 
contingent and part-time workers, and their 
overall work force turnover is high. In ad 
dition, because many unions represent call 
centers in their own particular industry, they 
often have fought each other in jurisdictional 
battles over who should represent workers in 
subcontractor firms. The result is that most 
subcontractors remain unorganized. 
Methodology 
The Global Call Center (GCC) project 
was initiated in 2002 by researchers in the 
United States and United Kingdom, who 
had examined the emergence of this sector 
in the 1990s and who wanted to extend their 
previous work both theoretically and cross 
nationally. By the early 2000s, the globaliza 
tion of service work became an important 
topic, as large multinationals increasingly 
experimented with the outsourcing and off 
shoring of work to emerging markets in 
India, South Africa, and the Philippines 
(Huws 2003; Poster 2007). At the same time, 
the dramatic growth of these operations in 
Europe led to new research on the topic in 
several countries (Holtgrewe, Kerst, and Shire 
2002; Deery and Kinnie 2004). To expand 
the project, scholars were recruited who had 
a strong research track record and interest in 
the management and employment practices 
of call centers. Participation in the project 
was conditional on country research teams' 
agreement to follow a common comparative 
qualitative and quantitative methodology 
(detailed below) and contribute their survey 
data to an international database, in exchange 
for access to it. 
Given that our research focused on the 
global scope of call center operations, we were 
inclusive rather than exclusive, attempting 
to include a large number of diverse coun 
tries so that we could assess the meaning of 
"globalization" in this context. We recruited 
researchers from countries that would pro 
vide the basis for meaningful comparisons of 
different national institutional settings across 
coordinated, liberal market, and emerging 
market economies. However, although the 
countries in the study represent a reasonable 
sample of coordinated, liberal market, and 
emerging market economies, they were not 
hand-picked based on specific criteria; rather, 
participation depended on the interests of 
country teams and on their ability to fund 
their own projects. 
The research teams responsible for data 
collection in each country are listed in Ap 
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pendix A. They include some 50 research 
ers in 17 countries (Japan and China were 
added after the initial wave of data collection, 
and so are not part of the database for this 
volume). Project sponsors are listed in Ap 
pendix B. This recruitment process produced 
a research team covering a wide range of dis 
ciplines (human resource studies, industrial 
relations, occupational psychology, political 
economy, sociology) and with expertise in a 
variety of methodologies (survey, case study, 
cross-national comparative research). The 
multidisciplinary resource base was valuable 
for solving various theoretical and method 
ological challenges. 
A major challenge was to implement the 
research methodology consistently across 
countries. To do so, project leaders had initial 
one-on-one meetings with each country team 
to reach agreement on the research method 
ology, including how the survey instrument 
would be translated and piloted with focus 
groups; how the population of establishments 
would be identified and the sample selected; 
and how relatively high response rates would 
be ensured.1 The complete details on survey 
methodology are discussed below and found 
in Appendix C. We also established guide 
lines for qualitative research, including the 
types of questions to address and the range of 
informants to interview: managers at various 
levels of the organization, employees where 
possible, union representatives, industry 
experts, and government officials. 
Survey Development and Administration 
The establishment-level survey is based on 
previous surveys of business strategies and 
human resource practices in call centers, 
developed by members of the U.S. and U.K. 
JTo improve cross-national coordination, research 
ers engaged in regular conference calls, emails, and 
three international workshops in 2004, 2005, and 2007 
to discuss theoretical and methodological issues and 
to report initial findings. As only a handful of people 
knew each other before the start of the project, we used 
these communications and workshops to identify shared 
thematic interests?such as the role of unions in shaping 
job quality or strategic human resource management and 
performance. These thematic collaborations became the 
basis for the empirical articles in this volume. 
research teams and used in earlier published 
studies (Batt 2000, 2001, 2002; Wood, Hol 
man, and Stride 2006). The U.S. and U.K. 
teams revised the survey for the international 
study based on pilot-testing and face-to-face 
interviews with call center managers. The 
core survey covers theoretically driven 
questions on the role of institutions and 
management strategies in this setting. Top 
ics included market conditions, customer 
segments, business strategies, organizational 
features, work design, human resource prac 
tices, non-standard employment practices, 
wages, tenure, turnover, absenteeism, use 
of government programs, and collective 
bargaining coverage. 
The survey combines context-specific ques 
tions based on our prior call center surveys; 
questions concerning actual management 
and employment practices, based on national 
surveys such as the British Work and Employ 
ment Relations Survey (WERS) and similar 
surveys in the United States (Osterman 1994); 
and multi-item scales measuring constructs 
such as job discretion and performance 
monitoring from organizational behavior 
research (Holman 2002; Holman, Chissick, 
and Totterdell 2002; Wood, Holman, and 
Stride 2006). Each country team translated 
the survey, piloted it again using interviews or 
focus groups, and modified questions to make 
them appropriate for their national context. 
The presence of bilingual speakers in each 
team also facilitated the translation process. 
Survey administration occurred from 
2003 to 2006. The respondent was the se 
nior manager at each center?typically the 
general manager, senior operations manager, 
or senior HR manager. Establishment-level 
surveys are more reliable than corporate 
level surveys (Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, 
and Snell 2000) because managers are more 
familiar with the establishment in which 
they work and human resource practices 
are more 
homogeneous. Because workplace 
practices vary by occupational group within 
establishments, we asked respondents to an 
swer questions as they applied to the "core" 
occupational group (Osterman 1994; Batt 
2001)?in this context, call center agents. 
Where call centers served more than one 
customer segment, respondents answered 
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questions for the agents serving the largest 
segment. Every effort was made to take a 
consistent approach to survey administration, 
but there was some variation across countries 
(see Appendix C). Nine countries used tele 
phone surveys, four used on-site visits, and 
the remainder used a combination of mail, 
email, and fax. These differences were due 
largely to local conditions. For example, in 
the emerging market economies of Brazil, 
India, South Africa, and South Korea, the 
teams used on-site interviews because survey 
research in these countries is relatively un 
developed and mail and telephone surveys 
yield particularly low response rates. In the 
United Kingdom, telephone interviews were 
used in combination with a postal survey, as 
many managers expressed a preference for 
filling in a paper-based version of the survey. 
Sampling Strategy 
Several steps were adopted to establish 
a consistent approach to sampling, but 
some variation occurred across countries 
(Appendix C). Identifying the population 
of call centers was the most difficult step, 
because most countries have no government 
statistics on these establishments. Current 
nomenclatures of economic activity, such as 
the European Union's NACE (an industry 
classification system), only recently have 
added call centers as a category. Thus, 
national statistics tend to underreport the 
number of these operations?particularly 
the number of in-house units within primary 
firms. Each country team chose the sample 
from the largest available source, which in 
practice meant the membership list of the 
national call center employers' association, 
supplemented by on-line lists, telephone 
books, and lists from regional economic de 
velopment agencies. We found that our data 
on the number of centers by sector and by 
in-house/subcontractor status were generally 
consistent with estimates provided by other 
available surveys of call centers. Exceptions 
include the United States, where the telecom 
munications industry was over-sampled in our 
study, and Germany, where subcontractors 
were over-represented. All of the papers in 
this volume use both ownership status and 
sector in their analyses. 
In several countries, the population of 
call centers was small enough that close to 
the entire population was surveyed (Austria, 
Denmark, Israel, Poland, Spain, South Ko 
rea) . Other countries used a random sam 
pling strategy (as they did not have enough 
information to create a meaningful stratified 
sample) or a stratified sample by sector and 
size (United States, France). All papers in this 
volume control for sector and establishment 
size. For the emerging market economies of 
Brazil, India, South Africa, and South Korea, 
the on-site survey administration meant that 
researchers needed to focus on one or a few 
geographic areas (Sao Paulo in Brazil, Seoul 
in South Korea, six primary "call center cit 
ies" in India, two primary "call center cities" 
in South Africa). They identified the largest 
list of call centers available and administered 
the surveys wherever they could get access to 
establishments. Thus, the samples are large 
and non-random. 
The resulting sample includes 2,477 call 
centers, which cover a work force of about 
475,000. Most of the countries have a 
sample size of between 100 to 200 observa 
tions, with samples of less than 100 in the 
smaller or emerging market economies, 
and larger samples in the United States 
and Canada. Every effort was made to 
increase the response rates with frequent 
follow-up calls and emails. One country 
(the Netherlands) was excluded from the 
quantitative papers in this volume due to a 
low response rate. The weighted response 
rate for the remainder of the dataset (16 
countries, 2,359 observations) was 72%; 
the unweighted country average was 54%. 
We also examined potential biases in the 
data. The most important, we believe, stems 
from the use of employers' association lists 
to identify the population of establishments. 
This source biases the sample toward the 
better-operated centers because association 
members tend to be larger and more estab 
lished operators, often part of large national 
or multinational corporations. Similarly, in 
the on-site interviews in emerging market 
economies, it is probable that better-run 
centers were more willing to have academic 
researchers come on site and conduct in 
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terviews. This leads us to expect that the 
sample, in general, is biased toward larger, 
more established centers with more formal 
ized human resource practices and higher 
wage levels than would otherwise be expected. 
International Data Set 
Creation and Variable Creation 
Although each research team was respon 
sible for inputting the data from the survey it 
conducted, the process of amalgamating the 
data sets from each country was centralized 
and conducted by statistician Chris Stride from 
the Institute of Work Psychology, Sheffield 
University, who has extensive experience in 
creating and working with large, complex data 
sets. Each country was required to provide the 
survey data on the core questions according to 
a predefined format with consistent variable 
names. After data integration, the amalgam 
ated data set was sent back to research teams 
to check. The final dataset also included a 
set of specifically created variables and scales 
to ensure consistency in variable definitions 
across papers in this volume. 
The variables used by papers in this volume 
are defined in Appendix D. The means and 
standard deviations of variables, by country, 
are found in Appendix E. The reliability 
scores for scales are found in each paper, as 
each paper uses a slightly different sample, 
depending on model specifications. In a few 
cases, authors created a specific index based 
on the literature they were addressing. These 
indices, and the specific reasoning behind 
them, are found in the individual papers 
that use them. 
We coded each country as having one of 
three types of economy: coordinated, liberal 
market, or emerging market. Coordinated 
economies are Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Spain, and Sweden; liberal mar 
ket economies, Canada, Ireland, Israel, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States; and 
emerging market economies, Brazil, India, 
Poland, South Africa, and South Korea. The 
assignment of countries to the categories 
of liberal market or coordinated economy 
was based on Hall and Gingerich's (2004) 
classification of twenty developed nations, 
although there was one exception, Israel, 
which is excluded from Hall and Gingerich's 
classification schema. We classified Israel as 
having a liberal market economy, in keeping 
with recent research (Cohen, Haberfeld, 
Mundlak, and Saporta 2003; Mundlak 2007). 
As discussed above, the emerging market 
group in some ways represents a residual 
category, as there are large differences in the 
colonial histories and national institutions 
of these countries; but current similarities 
exist in their labor market conditions and 
location in the global economy. For purposes 
of empirical analysis, we begin by grouping 
them together and then assess the utility of 
this categorization. 
Findings 
Our findings indicate that the call center 
sector has a complex pattern of convergence 
and divergence in management and employ 
ment practices, which is best understood as a 
multi-level phenomenon. It varies according 
to the specific dimension of the employment 
system we consider. Across all countries, for 
example, the sector looks quite similar in 
terms of the scope of markets, service offer 
ings, technologies, and some organizational 
features?dimensions of work that are less 
influenced by institutional rules or norms. 
Beyond these similarities, however, we find 
divergent patterns in the organization of 
work, human resource practices, and labor 
relations?those dimensions that are more 
influenced by national laws, industrial rela 
tions systems, and institutional norms. Im 
portant, statistically significant differences 
distinguish coordinated economies as a group 
from liberal market and emerging market 
economies?particularly in the organization 
of work, wage dispersion, and collective rep 
resentation. Beyond this, however, national 
variation is salient, particularly for emerging 
market economies, which, as other studies 
have found, do not have many patterns in 
common (Orru et al. 1997; Biggart and 
Guillen 2002). 
In addition, important patterns of sub 
national variation exist in most countries, 
based on the roles played by unions and works 
councils, as well as by business strategies of 
market segmentation and subcontracting. 
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These are related to within-country variation 
in work organization, the use of contingent 
staffing, and levels of pay?although the size 
and significance of these differences varies 
across countries. Findings at this level are 
consistent with a pattern of simultaneous 
convergence and divergence (Katz and Dar 
bishire 2000). For example, different busi 
ness strategies lead to statistically significant 
differences in the quality of jobs and pay 
within most countries, but the magnitude 
of these differences varies across countries, 
depending importantly on country-specific 
institutions and laws. To illustrate these 
patterns in the discussion below, we bring 
together descriptive statistics from our inter 
national data, examples from our fieldwork, 
and the results of multivariate analyses from 
the papers in this volume. The country-by 
country descriptive statistics are found in 
Appendix E. 
Convergence: Markets and Technology 
In all of the countries in this study, call 
centers represent a recent development? 
an emerging set of activities, initially led by 
the firms in the telecommunications and 
financial services industries. Most centers 
deal mainly with inbound calls from cus 
tomers (79%), rather than outbound calls 
or solicitations to customers (21%). The 
typical or median call center in this study 
was 7 years old in 2007, with a low of 4 years 
old in India and a high of 12 years old in 
the United States. These figures suggest 
that the sector emerged in most countries 
within a relatively compressed timeframe of 
the same decade, with some countries more 
advanced (for example, the United States) 
and others lagging somewhat behind (for 
example, India). Of course, this estimate 
is suggestive rather than definitive, because 
our data cannot take into account the rate 
of survival of call centers and whether this 
varies cross-nationally. However, by using 
the median we are reducing the influence of 
centers that are very recent and those with 
longer trajectories in traditional industries. 
In addition, this idea of a parallel devel 
opment of the sector across many countries 
is consistent with what we know from our 
fieldwork about changes that took place in 
the 1990s across the globe: call center tech 
nology became widely available; long distance 
transmission costs declined rapidly; pioneer 
ing industries such as telecommunications 
and financial services were deregulated 
in most countries; new multinational call 
center providers emerged; and technology 
consultants, such as Datamonitor, were ac 
tive in helping companies set up centers in 
countries around the world. 
Global Trade and Employment Patterns 
Our data also document the extent to 
which call center services are globally traded. 
In our survey, we asked managers whether 
the markets they served were primarily local, 
regional, national, or international. Despite 
the fact that centers are highly mobile 
and that transmission costs have declined 
substantially, we found that most call cen 
ters were primarily oriented toward their 
own domestic markets. Thirty percent of 
all centers primarily served their local or 
regional markets, while 56% served their 
own national market, and only 14% served 
the international market. Given that our 
data are biased in favor of centers owned 
by established corporations, these numbers 
may understate the percentage of the market 
that was locally or regionally oriented. These 
figures did not vary substantially across 
coun 
tries, with the exception of those that special 
ize in off-shore services: India, Ireland, and 
Canada. Although Canada is rarely noticed 
as a major off-shoring location, it has become 
an important site for subcontractors serving 
U.S. corporations because of its contiguity 
to 
the United States; its linguistic, cultural, and 
time-zone compatibility with its neighbor; its 
government-provided health care system; 
and its currency, which usually has a low 
rate of exchange with the U.S. dollar. The 
Canadian national study found that almost 
one-third of establishments surveyed focused 
on "nearshore" services to the United States 
(van Jaarsveld et al. 2007). 
Our field research also confirmed that the 
international spread of services is 
uneven 
and based on historic linguistic and post 
colonial ties: between France and French 
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post-colonial countries such as Morocco and 
Tunisia; Spain and Latin America; the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, India, and South 
Africa; and the United States and Ireland, 
India, Canada, and the Philippines. Lan 
guage and culture constrain the locational 
choices of corporations, creating a pattern 
of off-shoring that differs substantially from 
that found in manufacturing, where cost and 
access to markets are primary drivers. 
This pattern of the diffusion of call cen 
ters around the world is different from that 
of globalization in manufacturing, which is 
characterized by a shift in employment from 
advanced to emerging market economies. 
While evidence suggests that call center em 
ployment is growing more rapidly in countries 
such as India and the Philippines, there is 
little evidence that employment is shifting 
from the advanced to emerging markets. 
Moreover, our data suggest that off-shore 
call center services represent a much smaller 
proportion of global activity than media ac 
counts have suggested. 
Accurate call center employment data 
are difficult to procure, as governments do 
not collect these data; but we have compiled 
estimates for each country based on a variety 
of sources (See Appendix C). In the United 
States and Canada, call centers employed 
about 3% of the work force in the early 2000s 
(Datamonitor 2001,2003,2004; van Jaarsveld 
etal.2007). Battetal. (2006) estimated U.S. 
call center employment in 2004 at 4 million 
workers (almost 3% of the work force), based 
on an analysis of occupational data from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our analy 
sis of these data for 2007 suggests that call 
center workers still comprise about 3% of 
American workers. They represent about 1 % 
of the work force in Denmark, France, and 
Germany, and 3% in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (Lloyd, Weinkopf, and Batt 
2009). Employment in these centers grew at 
an estimated 20% annually in the 1990s in the 
advanced economies. The growth rate slowed 
in the 2000s, but call center employment as 
a percentage of the work force appears to be 
stable or growing in advanced economies. 
The employment picture in emerging mar 
ket economies is more difficult to capture, 
and estimates come entirely from interested 
parties?industry consultants and employers' 
associations. The Indian National Association 
of Software and Services Companies (NASS 
COM), however, has a research arm with a 
credible reputation for accuracy (Kuruvilla 
and Ranganathan 2009). Call centers are 
categorized as part of the Business Processes 
Outsourcing (BPO) segment of the Informa 
tion Technology Enabled Services (ITES) 
sector, and represent about 40% of overall 
BPO employment. According to NASSCOM, 
BPO employment grew from about 316,000 
in 2003-2004 to 700,000 in 2008 (NASSCOM 
2008), suggesting that call center employ 
ment grew from 126,000 to 280,000 in the 
same period. These employees only serve 
the international market, with an estimated 
two-thirds, or 185,000, serving the U.S. mar 
ket in 2008. These numbers do not include 
the large and growing number of employees 
serving the Indian domestic market. Call 
center employment in other emerging mar 
ket economies in 2008 includes 285,600 in 
China, 32,760 in Malaysia, 129,000 in the 
Philippines, 25,700 in Thailand, and 20,500 
in Singapore (callcentres.net 2008). With 
the exception of India and the Philippines, 
centers in these countries primarily serve 
their own domestic market. 
The international distribution of employ 
ment in the future will depend on the relative 
growth rates in these countries. One estimate 
puts growth in the off-shore call center market 
at more than 25% per year (Everest Research 
Institute 2008). The 2008 callcenters.net 
study estimates a growth rate of about 20% per 
year between 2006 and 2008. However, the 
percentage of centers providing international 
service has declined somewhat?from 67% 
of call centers in Asia in 2006 to 48% in 2007 
(callcentres.net 2008). This is supported by 
anecdotal evidence that some companies are 
re-contracting call center work back to their 
home countries. Another wrinkle in attempts 
to calculate employment effects, however, is 
that call centers serving the domestic market 
of these countries are also growing. Thus, it 
is not clear whether the drop in the percent 
age of international service providers is due 
to a decline in demand or a relative increase 
in centers serving the domestic market in 
these countries. 
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In sum, the emergence of the call center 
sector is a recent phenomenon everywhere, 
despite the fact that this model of service 
interactions has deep roots in the operator 
service divisions of telecommunications and 
telemarketing companies. Employment ap 
pears to be growing in most countries, but 
faster in emerging markets than in advanced 
economies. Despite the rapid growth of 
employment in India and the Philippines, 
they still handle only a small percentage 
of service interactions for the two major 
country users?the United States and 
United Kingdom. In addition, with the 
exception of a few export-oriented coun 
tries (India, the Philippines, Canada, and 
Ireland), the extent of global trade in call 
center services is relatively limited, as most 
call center sectors primarily serve their own 
domestic markets. 
Technology, Standardization, 
and Organizational Characteristics 
The widespread availability of call center 
technology around the world has facilitated 
the diffusion of automated work processes 
that are emblematic of these workplaces. 
This technology rationalizes work practices by 
automatically distributing calls to agents and 
by enabling the collection of performance 
metrics (such as call handling time, wrap 
up time, the number of calls per employee 
per day, and adherence to scripted texts) 
through electronic monitoring systems. The 
availability of these metrics allows managers 
to develop quite standardized requirements 
for employee behavior, work routines, and 
performance. 
Standardization of work practices and 
electronic monitoring have been central 
themes in research on call centers, as mo 
notony, routinizationjob dissatisfaction, and 
job-related stress have been major sources of 
workers' complaints, reflected in high rates of 
absenteeism and turnover and lower levels of 
individual performance (Holman 2002; Hol 
man, Chissick, and Totterdell 2002; Deery, 
Iverson, and Walsh 2002; Houlihan 2002; 
Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, and Walker 2008). 
High levels of standardization are typically 
found in centers serving mass market custom 
ers, or the general public, where the level of 
complexity of calls is modest, compared to 
those serving business customers with more 
idiosyncratic or firm-specific demands. In 
all countries, the overwhelming majority of 
employees (on average, 80%) work in centers 
serving the mass market or general market, 
where the quality of jobs is typically much 
lower than in business-to-business centers. 
Two indicators of standardization are 
average call handling time and the use of 
"multi-channel" technologies. Call handling 
time?the average (mean) time to handle a 
call?is a ubiquitous operational measure that 
the typical manager keeps track of on a daily 
basis. It is a measure of job cycle time, or the 
time to complete one task before repeating 
it again. Most centers focus on reducing 
the time per call in order to minimize labor 
costs. The typical worksite in this report had 
an average call handling time of 195 seconds; 
variation across countries ranged from a low 
of 150 to a high of 240, with India being an 
outlier at 300 seconds. 
Multi-channel technologies, by contrast, 
tend to reduce routinization at work by creat 
ing a variety of ways in which workers can in 
teractwith customers, including voice, email, 
fax, web enablement, Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP), media blending, and elec 
tronic customer relationship management 
(these are defined in Appendix D). As cen 
ters adopt more sophisticated technologies, 
this should be a source of variation in work 
and employment practices. Surprisingly, 
however, we found that variation in call cen 
ter technology across countries was modest, 
and relatively few centers had transformed 
themselves into multi-channel "contact" 
centers?the term used to differentiate these 
centers from purely voice ("call") centers. 
We found that the typical operation in most 
countries only used telephony, supplemented 
by fax and email. 
In this volume, the article by Sieben, de 
Grip, Longen, and S0rensen examines the 
implications of making greater use of multi 
channel technologies. Among the questions 
the authors address is whether the number 
of these technologies that are adopted by a 
call center affects investments in initial and 
on-going training, as well as the length of time 
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employees take to become proficient on the 
job. They also explore the differential effects 
of specific technologies, and the relationship 
between technology, training, and selective 
hiring practices. 
The particular characteristics of call center 
technology also influence the organizational 
structure of these workplaces. In particular, 
electronic monitoring technology reduces 
the need for indirect labor, so that the num 
ber of supervisors is low, spans of control are 
large, and the management hierarchy is flat. 
Managers constituted only 11 % of employees 
in the typical call center in this study, and 
there was little variation in this number across 
countries, with the range being from a low 
of 7% to a high of 15%. 
We also found that across all countries, 
call center work was defined as female work. 
Women comprised 69% of employees in 
the average call center, and this varied little 
across countries. The exception is India, 
where centers offered better than average 
paying jobs, and 54% of workers were male. 
Our fieldwork suggests that this gendered 
pattern of employment was related, in part, 
to managerial views that this work is essen 
tially clerical, requiring strong keyboarding 
skills, as well as the ability to interact politely 
with customers, even when they are overly 
demanding or abusive. 
In sum, when we examine the markets, 
technologies, and organizational features 
of call centers, we see an emerging sector 
with a number of quite similar characteristics 
across very different countries and national 
institutional environments. 
Divergence in Work Organization, HR 
Practices, and Collective Representation 
At the level of workplace practices, how 
ever, substantial differences across countries 
exist in the organization of work, human 
resource practices, and patterns of collective 
representation. The papers in this volume 
address similarities and differences in work 
design, use of contingent staffing, pay de 
termination, and collective representation. 
Overall, the researchers found statistically 
significant differences between coordinated, 
liberal, and emerging market economies 
along a number of these dimensions, and 
country-level differences as well. 
Work Organization 
Two important measures of work design 
in call centers, the level of individual job 
discretion and the level of performance 
monitoring, are the focus of the paper by 
Holman, Frenkel, S0rensen, and Wood in 
this volume. The estimates identify how 
coordinated economies differ from liberal 
and emerging market economies; but also 
yield some surprises, especially with respect 
to emerging market economies. In addition, 
the authors provide specific country-level 
findings and conduct a multivariate analysis 
of how these differences are related to impor 
tant outcomes, including employee turnover, 
labor costs, sales, and service quality. 
Doellgast, Holtgrewe, and Deery also 
examine employment practices associated 
with job quality, including high-involvement 
work practices, performance monitoring, 
and dismissal rates. Their measure of high 
involvement includes the level of discretion 
employees have, the use of teams, and the 
use of flexible work design. The authors 
identify notable differences across groups 
of countries by economic system, as well as 
variation among the countries within each of 
these three groups. The authors explain how 
these national-level differences are related 
to specific institutions affecting each area 
of employment practice, such as employ 
ment protection legislation and traditions 
of worker participation in decision-making. 
Non-Standard Work Arrangements 
In general, call centers are known for their 
extensive use of part-time and temporary 
workers to handle demand fluctuations and 
keep labor costs low. In the average call 
center, 71% of employees are full-time, 17% 
part-time, and 12% temporary. Demand 
forecasting is difficult because of large fluc 
tuations in call volume, which may occur on 
a daily, weekly, or seasonal basis (Batt and 
Moynihan 2002); and subcontractors face 
more fluctuations than in-house centers 
because the former often juggle several 
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contracts at once and do not know when a 
client may decide to terminate a contract. 
However, we found that coordinated 
economies made substantially greater use of 
part-time and contingent workers than did 
liberal market economies, and these differ 
ences were statistically significant. These 
differences are arguably due to differences in 
employment laws. In liberal market econo 
mies with weak employment protection laws 
(or "employment at will"), companies may 
handle demand fluctuations via involun 
tary or voluntary turnover. In coordinated 
economies with stricter employment protec 
tion laws, employers are more likely to rely 
on temporary workers to handle demand 
fluctuations. 
In addition, we found important differ 
ences among the countries in each of these 
groups. Two papers in this volume explore 
these country-level differences: Shire, Mott 
weiler, Schonauer, and Valverde examine 
cross-country differences among coordinated 
economies; van Jaarsveld, Kwon, and Frost, 
among liberal market economies. 
Shire et al. analyze the relative importance 
of institutional and organizational factors in 
shaping the use of temporary workers. They 
categorize countries according to the strin 
gency of laws protecting full-time workers as 
well as those restricting the use of temporary 
workers. While differences in regulatory re 
gimes appear to influence employer behavior 
in some cases, the exceptions are striking. 
By contrast, firm-level strategies that retain 
work in-house and invest in work force skills 
and training are consistent predictors of the 
use of long-term contracts as opposed to tem 
porary ones. Van Jaarsveld, Kwon, and Frost 
analyze how firms create work force flexibility 
and whether institutional differences among 
liberal market countries shape these choices. 
The cross-country variation they find gener 
ally supports the hypothesized influence of 
the labor legislation context. 
Among emerging market economies, by 
contrast, there are no consistent patterns 
in the use of contingent workers and large 
differences among countries: in South 
Korea, the typical call center had 85% of its 
work force under temporary contracts, but 
in India and South Africa, few call centers 
hired any temporary workers at all. Our 
field research suggests that these patterns 
depend not only on labor market regula 
tion, but also on the specific histories and 
market conditions in countries at the time 
the call center sector emerged. In South 
Korea, call centers emerged just after the 
Asian economic crisis in 1997, and employ 
ers sought ways to cut labor costs and avoid 
union contracts. Temporary labor contracts 
spread rapidly, becoming a norm throughout 
the call center sector (Kwon 2008). In India 
and South Africa, employers prefer full-time 
workers because of the high initial investment 
they must make in language neutralization 
and training. 
Collective Representation 
Differences across industrial relations 
systems offer one of the most salient explana 
tions for variation in work organization and 
pay practices in call centers in this study. In 
general, we found a much higher level of col 
lective bargaining and works council activity 
than we would have expected given that these 
operations have the capacity to relocate when 
faced with union organizing and unions have 
great difficulty organizing them. Just under 
50% of call centers in the international data 
base had some form of collective representa 
tion (unions and works councils, unions alone, 
or works councils alone). Thirty-five percent 
were covered by union agreements or unions 
plus works councils. 
Of course, these patterns reflect the mix 
of countries and size of the sample for each 
country in the database. Representing the 
largest proportion of the sample (46%) 
are liberal market economies (primarily 
the United States and Canada), which have 
low levels of unionization compared to the 
coordinated economies (which account for 
36% of the sample; the remaining 18% of call 
centers are in emerging market economies). 
The biases in the sampling frame favor the 
inclusion of large employers (relative to 
smaller ones), and the former are more likely 
to be covered by unions and works councils. 
However, the sampling frame also is likely to 
be biased in favor of subcontractors, because 
they are more likely tojoin call center employ 
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ers' associations than are in-house centers, 
which often are already affiliated to their own 
specific industry employers' association. Our 
field research showed this pattern to be true 
for Germany, and to a lesser extent France. 
With these caveats in mind, call centers 
had statistically significantly and substantially 
higher levels of representation in the coordi 
nated economies in this sample than in either 
the liberal market or emerging market econo 
mies. Among centers in the coordinated 
economies, 71 % had some form of collective 
representation (18% had union agreements 
only, 14% had works councils only, and 39% 
had union agreements plus works councils). 
These high levels reflect the fact that most 
call centers in coordinated economies con 
tinue to be operated as in-house centers, with 
inherited collective bargaining agreements 
and interest representation. In addition, 
three EU countries?Austria, France, and 
the Netherlands?have organized the sec 
tor of subcontractors; and the employers' 
association and unions have negotiated 
sectoral bargaining agreements that cover 
all employees working for subcontractors 
(Lloyd, Weinkopf, and Batt 2009). 
The average level of collective represen 
tation among liberal and emerging market 
economies was much lower, with on average 
less than 20% in the former and 35% in the 
latter having some form of representation. 
However, the range of variation within these 
groups was large. Among the liberal market 
economies in our study, collective represen 
tation coverage was highest in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom (63% and 65%, respec 
tively, counting coverage by a union, a works 
council, or both), and lowest in Canada and 
the United States (with union coverage of 
16% and less than 10%, respectively). Simi 
larly, among emerging markets, Brazil had 
high collective bargaining coverage (80%), 
whereas South Korea and Poland had little 
(less than 10% each). 
An important finding in the prior literature 
on wage determination is that pay disper 
sion and the union/non-union wage gap 
are lower in systems characterized by high 
levels of centralization and coordination. 
In this volume, Batt and Nohara examine 
this relationship for the call center sector. 
Their findings are mostly consistent with 
prior findings, but some divergent patterns 
emerge?in particular, with Germany more 
closely resembling the liberal market pat 
tern, and the United Kingdom and Israel 
resembling the coordinated market pattern. 
These findings remain statistically signifi 
cant after the analysis controls for human 
capital, business strategies of segmentation 
and subcontracting, and organizational and 
market factors. 
In coordinated economies, works councils 
also provide an important forum for consul 
tation at the firm and establishment levels 
(Doellgast 2008). While the regulations 
governing works councils differ from country 
to country, these councils generally provide a 
forum for elected employee representatives 
to consult with management over working 
conditions, work redesign, and restructur 
ing. In this volume, Doellgast et al. examine 
whether and how different forms of collective 
representation influence employment prac 
tices associated with high-quality jobs. They 
compare worksites in coordinated economies 
with unions and works councils, unions alone, 
works councils alone, and neither form of 
representation to union and non-union call 
centers in liberal economies. The results con 
firm that outcomes depended significantly on 
the type of bargaining structure, especially in 
coordinated economies, where "dual bargain 
ing" (the presence of both a union and works 
council agreement) appears to have had the 
best outcomes for job quality. 
Simultaneous Patterns of 
Convergence and Divergence 
Business strategies that separate call center 
tasks by product, market segment, or function 
and allocate them to different call center 
locations often lead to increased variation in 
the design of work, HR practices, and labor 
relations within countries. We examined two 
of these approaches in this study: market 
segmentation and outsourcing strategies. 
Product and Labor Market Segmentation 
We found that market segmentation 
strategies existed in all of the countries in 
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the study, but they were more extensive in 
some countries than in others. They were 
more widespread in the United States and 
United Kingdom, for example, than in most 
coordinated economies. This pattern does 
not appear to have been due to national 
institutional differences. Rather, segmen 
tation strategies depended importantly on 
the scope of the market and sophistication 
of the business and marketing strategies of 
corporations. They depended on the ability 
of firms to identify discrete market segments 
and to create a customer base large enough 
to enable them to achieve economies of scale 
by segmenting and serving each group sepa 
rately. These conditions were not present in 
small countries, such as Austria and Denmark. 
The differences between centers serving 
large business and those serving the general 
or mass market were statistically significant 
along several dimensions in many countries, 
including the extent to which they were cov 
ered by collective bargaining. Across almost 
all countries, union coverage in large business 
centers was lower than in mass market cen 
ters, and these differences were not based on 
whether countries had coordinated, liberal, 
or emerging market economies. 
The paper by Holman and colleagues also 
demonstrates that decisions about work de 
sign in call centers?specifically, about levels 
of job discretion and performance monitor 
ing?were shaped by the customer segment 
served. These choices also had implications 
for performance outcomes. 
Ownership Structures: In-House 
Centers and Subcontractors 
The differences between in-house centers 
and subcontractors also are salient in most 
of the countries in this study. We generally 
found that subcontractors took on more 
transactional work and differed from in-house 
centers along many dimensions: they were 
newer market entrants, more likely to serve 
the international market, larger in size, and 
more likely to focus exclusively on sales and 
outbound calls. They offered lower-discre 
tion jobs, had higher levels of performance 
monitoring, made greater use of part-time 
and temporary workers, paid lower wages, 
had higher quit rates, and were less likely to 
be covered by union contracts. Moreover, 
subcontractors have grown at a faster rate 
than in-house centers. 
According to our international data, sub 
contractors' typical size was 77 employees, 
compared to 41 for in-house centers; the 
average size was 254, versus 124. These fig 
ures are statistically significantly different. 
Subcontractors employed 56% of all call 
center employees in the study, even though 
they only made up 33% of all call centers. 
Because of these differences in size, sub 
contractors can make more use of automation 
and standardized work practices and achieve 
greater economies of scale. For example, 
the agents working for subcontractors in 
our study typically handled 80 calls per day, 
which is significantly higher than the 65 calls 
per day typically handled by in-house center 
agents. Forty-eight percent of subcontrac 
tors reported jobs with little or no discre 
tion, compared to 35% of in-house centers. 
Performance monitoring in subcontractors 
typically occurred on a weekly basis, com 
pared to a monthly basis in in-house centers. 
These patterns are consistent with research 
showing that client firms tend to ensure 
quality control by setting strict standards 
for adherence to standard work rules and 
performance monitoring. 
Compared to in-house centers, subcontrac 
tors also hired a significantly lower propor 
tion of full-time permanent employees. In 
the average subcontractor, 63% of agents 
were full-time permanent employees, 21% 
part-time, and 16% temporary. In in-house 
centers, by contrast, 74% were full-time, 15% 
part-time, and 10% temporary. Variation in 
the magnitude of these differences across 
countries is analyzed in the papers by Shire 
et al. and van Jaarsveld et al. in this volume. 
In addition, subcontractors invested almost 
50% less in the initial training of new hires. 
While the typical subcontractor provided 14 
days of initial training, this figure was 20 days 
for in-house centers. After initial training, a 
newly hired employee at the typical subcon 
tractor site took 8.5 weeks to become fully 
qualified or proficient at work; for in-house 
centers, this break-in period was 12 weeks 
(see Sieben et al. this volume for a complete 
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analysis). These data indicate that there were 
substantial differences between subcontrac 
tors and in-house centers in the level of job 
complexity and in the need for firm-specific 
skills. This pattern was quite similar across 
countries. It is also in keeping with the fact 
that client firms typically outsource their 
more transactional, less complex work to 
subcontractors. 
Pay differentials also differed significantly 
between in-house centers and subcontractors 
in almost all countries in the study; but as 
presented by Batt and Nohara, the magni 
tude of differences varied across countries. 
Similarly, collective bargaining coverage was 
considerably lower among subcontractors 
than among in-house centers in virtually 
every country, but the magnitude of differ 
ences varied across countries. Unions were 
recognized for collective bargaining in 41 % of 
in-house call centers and 29% of subcontrac 
tors. By contrast, there were no significant 
differences in works council activity, which 
stood at 35% of the call centers for in-house 
centers and subcontractors. 
These differences between in-house cen 
ters and subcontractors may be explained, 
in part, by differences in the market and 
operational conditions that subcontractors 
face, which are considerable, according to 
our survey and case study research and that 
of others (Doellgast 2008; Batt, Doellgast, 
and Kwon 2006; S0rensen 2008; Flecker et 
al. 2008). Outsourcing involves risks for 
companies, as they have little direct control 
over quality. As a result, they often insist on 
vendor agreements that specify operational 
procedures in great detail?leading to close 
monitoring of operations and to an overall 
reduction in the discretion of both the man 
agers and call center agents. Subcontrac 
tors also juggle multiple contracts and face 
uncertainty in demand, as client firms may 
initiate or cancel contracts on short notice. 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this study, we have addressed the 
convergence-divergence debate by focusing 
on new service activities that have received 
little attention in prior institutional research. 
We chose call centers in part because they 
represent an extreme test case: if national in 
stitutions are able to influence these relatively 
mobile and cost-focused operations, then we 
can conclude that institutional legacies are 
more resilient than many have supposed, 
and that they remain influential in shaping 
management and employment practices in 
new economic activities. 
Our findings reveal a complex pattern of 
similarities and differences?one that we can 
best describe as multi-layered. We found pat 
terns of convergence internationally along 
some dimensions of organizations, but diver 
gence along other dimensions at multiple 
levels of analysis?not only at the level of 
economic systems, but also at national and 
sub-national levels. One of the contributions 
of this volume, we believe, is its unpacking 
of the ways in which different dimensions of 
the employment relationship are more or less 
susceptible to influence from external or in 
ternational market factors. Those dimensions 
that are most closely related to technologies, 
operations management, and marketing 
appear to be most influenced by processes 
of diffusion across countries. Those dimen 
sions that are more embedded in everyday 
work life and workplace relations seem to be 
more influenced by national institutions and 
organizational legacies. 
Call centers in most countries are quite 
similar in the ways that markets have been 
organized and centers have specialized in 
particular products, industries, or service 
offerings. Flat organizational structures, 
a predominantly female work force, and 
relatively standardized work based on call 
center technologies are characteristic of 
these establishments across most countries 
and suggest patterns of widespread diffusion 
and organizational learning. 
Divergence across different types of 
economic systems and national contexts is 
evident in alternative approaches to work 
design, human resource practices, and col 
lective representation. Even in this footloose 
sector, we found meaningful and statistically 
significant differences between centers in 
coordinated economies and those in liberal 
and emerging market ones. On average, 
coordinated economies had better-quality 
jobs?when defined in terms of the levels 
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of employee discretion and performance 
monitoring, which are partially reflected in 
lower quit and dismissal rates. Collective 
representation was also substantially more 
prevalent in coordinated economies than in 
the other economies, and the role of works 
councils was particularly important as a point 
of leverage for influencing the quality of 
work and employment conditions. However, 
coordinated economies also made greater 
use of part-time and contingent workers as 
a strategy to deal with employment protec 
tion legislation or avoid union contracts?a 
pattern that led to more precarious jobs 
and working conditions for a subgroup of 
employees in this sector. 
At the national level of analysis, we also 
found numerous examples of employment 
practices that diverged from the overall pat 
tern of differences across economic systems. 
Here, the role of specific characteristics of 
national institutions mattered; for example, 
Germany diverged from the coordinated 
pattern on a number of dimensions, and the 
United Kingdom and Israel diverged from 
the liberal market pattern. We view these 
findings as consistent with the idea that pat 
terns of convergence and divergence occur 
at multiple levels of analysis. 
The results of our analyses of emerging 
market countries leave many questions un 
answered. On the one hand, we did find 
several consistent patterns: emerging market 
countries showed patterns of work organiza 
tion, human resource practices, and labor 
relations that were quite similar to those 
found in liberal economies. In particular, 
the two sets of countries had similar levels of 
decentralized bargaining structures and wage 
dispersion, and similarly low levels of union 
power, limiting unions' ability to influence 
work practices in these new economy service 
activities. On the other hand, the emerging 
markets also showed many more idiosyncratic 
differences at the national level, which we 
were not able to explain and which deserve 
more research at the individual country level. 
Perhaps most striking are the findings of 
within-country variation, which are consistent 
with the argument that parallel processes of 
convergence and divergence are occurring. 
In almost all countries, the differences be 
tween in-house centers and subcontractors 
are statistically significant. Subcontractors 
are typically larger in size, which allows 
them more opportunities for automation 
and standardization of work practices. The 
quality of jobs is lower than in in-house cen 
ters, as measured by levels of job discretion, 
performance monitoring, use of contingent 
workers, pay levels, and collective representa 
tion coverage. Countries vary, however, in the 
magnitudes of these differences, with some 
of the coordinated market countries having 
lower levels of within-country variation. 
Nonetheless, even in the coordinated 
economies, we believe there is an emerging 
institutional divide based on differences 
between in-house establishments and subcon 
tractors. The coordinated economies have 
some advantages here, because most have 
legally mandated works councils that offer 
points of leverage for improving the working 
conditions in subcontractor centers. How 
ever, the differences are difficult to overcome, 
because unions have had relatively little suc 
cess in organizing subcontractors (Doellgast, 
Batt, and S0rensen,2OO9; Hoist 2008). 
Based on our international data, about 
one-third of centers in this study were run 
by subcontractors, but about 50% of the jobs 
were found there. More important, because 
the subcontractor sector is generally growing 
at a faster rate, we may observe over time an 
increasing shift in the distribution of jobs to 
this group. This general trend is particularly 
important when we consider the future of 
employment practices in this sector. To the 
extent that subcontractors displace in-house 
centers, we would expect to see an increasing 
convergence in management and employ 
ment practices within and 
across countries. 
This process of institutional change may 
be best captured by the concept of "layer 
ing," developed by Schickler (2001) and 
Thelen (2002), among others. Rather than 
viewing institutional change as occurring 
primarily through exogenous shocks that 
create moments of crisis and readjustment, 
Streeck and Thelen (2005) argued that insti 
tutional change may also occur incrementally, 
through endogenous changes in the system. 
Layering refers to a process by which new 
policies or practices emerge and, over time, 
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displace older institutional rules because the 
former grow at a faster rate than the latter. 
This differential growth thesis is illustrated 
in a set of empirical studies in Streeck and 
Thelen (2005), including a study by Jacob 
Hacker (2005) of the U.S. public pension 
system, which has eroded over time with the 
more rapid growth of private retirement plans 
such as Individual Retirement Accounts and 
401 (k) plans. While the concept of layering 
has been used primarily to describe changes 
in political institutions and the state, we 
believe it is applicable to institutions in the 
private sector as well. The use of subcontrac 
tors as an option for economic activity is not a 
departure from the past; but over time, firms 
have increasingly shifted work from vertically 
integrated organizations with institutional 
ized norms and internal labor markets to 
new economic actors operating outside of 
these norms. In our study of call centers, 
employers are escaping from industry-based 
industrial relations systems through sub 
contracting strategies; and by increasingly 
shifting work from older organizations to 
these new actors, they change the dominant 
employment model over time?from one 
based on labor management negotiation 
and collectively bargained labor standards, 
to one based on managerial unilateralism. 
Thus, while the evidence to date from our 
study shows that divergent management 
practices continue to exist, based in part 
on national institutional rules and norms, 
the pressures of liberalization are likely to 
continue to erode these distinctive patterns, 
at least in new economy services of the kind 
we have examined here. 
Also noteworthy is the fact that media 
coverage and policy debates have focused 
particularly on the threat that off-shoring 
poses for labor in advanced economies. Our 
analysis suggests, however, that off-shoring 
still represents a relatively small proportion 
of overall employment in the sector; and most 
centers serve their own domestic population 
rather than an international one. We find 
that outsourcing to subcontractors within 
the domestic market may represent a more 
salient threat to the quality of jobs and pay 
in these types of new service jobs. 
Finally, this study has several limitations 
that suggest areas for future research. First, 
while we have documented patterns of con 
vergence and divergence at different levels of 
analysis, we need to more fully explain how 
and why these have occurred. Qualitative and 
historical studies can provide more compel 
ling narratives to explain these patterns. A 
number of members of this project team are 
pursuing these avenues, as in a forthcoming 
special issue of the European Journal of Indus 
trial Relations (Doellgast, Batt, and S0rensen 
2009) on industrial restructuring and union 
organizing. 
A second program of research is one that 
would empirically trace the role of technol 
ogy vendors and consultants in the diffusion 
of policies and practices across firms and 
establishments?certainly in the call center 
sector, but also in other service activities 
driven by advances in digital technologies. 
While we present evidence of similar pat 
terns across countries in the adoption of call 
center technology, organizational forms, and 
the categorization of markets to be served, 
we have not explained how and why these 
similarities have emerged. However, our 
research has uncovered case study and anec 
dotal evidence that U.S. firms developed call 
center technology at an earlier date than did 
firms in other countries. U.S. firms became 
the leaders of dissemination of call center 
technology, which embodied not only the 
specific technology, but a set of neo-Taylorist 
assumptions in the technical design and 
associated monitoring mechanisms. For 
example, the dominant providers of call 
center technology are U.S. multinationals, 
which are over-represented among the five 
firms that, together, supply two-thirds of the 
Asian market: Cisco (U.S. 18%), Avaya (U.S. 
18%), Nortel (Canada 12%), Panasonic (Ja 
pan 12%), and Alcatel-Lucent (France-U.S. 
6%) (Callcentres.net 2007). 
A third and broader avenue for research 
ers, which we have signaled above, is to 
undertake theoretical and empirical work to 
integrate emerging market economies into 
the varieties-of-capitalism framework. This 
research could provide a more compelling 
typology of alternative forms of capitalist 
activity in these countries. The scope and 
scale of this international study led us to 
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focus more on current management prac 
tices and their extent of variation than on 
the historical development and trajectory 
of work organization and human resource 
practices. Studies of institutional change, 
however, require a historical or longitudinal 
approach that was not part of this research 
program, but should be part of future work. 
Fourth, our study favored a national in 
stitutional lens more than an organizational 
one, although we emphasized the need to 
focus on the intersection of institutions and 
employer strategies in order to understand 
the factors influencing alternative employ 
ment models. We took a broad view, using 
a combination of survey methods and field 
research. However, this approach needs 
to be complemented by in-depth analyses 
of lead firms and the ways in which their 
innovations are adopted and adapted by 
other firms in different countries. That 
is, to understand change, it is important 
to study the behavior of lead firms, which 
have the resources not only to experiment 
with new strategies and practices, but 
also to influence public policy in order 
to expand their options for competing in 
global markets. They disproportionately 
influence the direction of change. Thus, 
careful, longitudinal studies of particular 
lead multinational corporations?how they 
operate similarly or differently in a given 
sector, and how they influence the behav 
ior of other firms and public policy?are 
important complements to the research we 
have presented here. 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF SERVICE WORK* INTRODUCTION 475 
Appendix A 
Research Teams Responsible for Country Level Studies 
Austria 
Dr. Jorg Flecker 
Annika Schonauer 
Forschungs- und Beratungsstelle 
Arbeitswelt 
(FORBA) (Working Life Research Center) 
Australia 
Prof. Steve Frenkel 
Dr. Markus Groth 
University of New South Wales 
Brazil 
Prof. Moacir de Miranda OliveiraJunior 
University of Sao Paulo 
Prof. Leonardo Nelmi Trevisan 
Prof. Arnoldo de Hoyos Guevara 
Prof. Arnaldo J. Franca Mazzei 
Nogueira. 
Prof. Paulo Roberto Giao 
Maria de Fatima Silva 
Prof. Pedro Lucas de Resende Melo 
Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao 
Paulo 
Canada 
Prof. Ann Frost 
University of Western Ontario 
Prof. Danielle van Jaarsveld 
University of British Columbia 
David Walker 
University of British Columbia 
China 
Prof. Fang Xu 
Renmin University of China 
Dr. Xiangmin Liu 
Penn State University 
Denmark 
Prof. Niels M0eller 
Technical University of Denmark 
Dr. Ole Henning S0rensen 
National Research Center for the Working 
Environment, Denmark 
France 
Prof. Hiroatsu Nohara 
Dr. Robert Tchobanian 
Dr. Caroline Morandat-Lanciano 
Laboratory of Labour Economics and 
Industrial Sociology (CNRS) 
University of Aix-Marseille 
Germany 
Dr. Ursula Holtgrewe 
(FORBA) (Working Life Research 
Center) 
Prof. Karen Shire 
University of Duisburg-Essen 
Hanne Mottweiler 
University of Duisburg-Essen 
Jessica Longen 
University of Technology Darmstadt 
India 
Prof. Rosemary Batt 
Cornell University 
Ireland 
Prof. Maeve Houlihan 
Quinn School of Business 
Prof. Stephen Deery 
King's College London 
Dr. Nicholas Kinnie 
University of Bath 
Israel 
Prof Anat Rafaeli 
Technion?Israel Institute of 
Technology 
Prof. Iris Vilnai-Yavetz 
Ruppin Academic Center 
Japan 
Prof. Michio Nitta 
University of Tokyo 
Mr. Hodaka Maeura 
Japan Institute for Labor Policy and 
Training 
Netherlands 
Prof. Andries de Grip 
Maastricht University 
Dr. Inge Sieben 
University of Tilburg 
Prof. Danielle van Jaarsveld 
University of British Columbia 
South Africa 
Prof. Chris Benner 
University of California, Davis 
Mr. Charley Lewis 
University of the Witwatersrand 
Ms. Rah mat Omar 
University of the Western Cape 
South Korea 
Prof. Hyunji Kwon 
King's College London 
Dr. Hye-Young Kang 
POSRI, Seoul 
Prof. Byoung Hoon Lee 
Chung-Ang U, Seoul 
Spain 
Prof. Mireia Valverde 
Prof. Gerard Ryan 
Prof. Ferran Mane 
Prof. Maria Tatiana Gorjup 
Prof. Neus Marti 
Prof. Matilde Villarroya 
Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Sweden 
Prof. Ake Sandberg 
Stockholm University 
Dr. Christer Strandberg 
Mid Sweden University 
United Kingdom 
Dr. David Holman 
Prof. Stephen Wood 
Dr. Chris Stride 
University of Sheffield 
United States 
Prof. Rosemary Batt, 
Cornell University 
Prof. Virginia Doellgast 
London School of Economics 
Prof. Hyunji Kwon 
King's College London 
476 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
Appendix B 
Acknowledgment of Sponsors 
Austria: Jubilaumsfonds der Osterreichischen Nationalbank, FWF Austrian Science Fund 
Brazil: Associacao Brasileira de Telesservicos 
Canada: Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) 
Denmark: Russell Sage Foundation 
France: Russell Sage Foundation; French National Research Center; AFRC (Association Francoise des Centers de 
Relation Client?French Employers Association of Call Centers). 
Germany: Hans-Bockler-Stiftung; Russell Sage Foundation 
India: Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies, Cornell University 
Ireland: UCD Business Schools, University College Dublin 
Israel: Israel Ministry of Trade and Employment 
Netherlands: Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs; National Contact Centre Benchmark Platform (NCCBP); Russell 
Sage Foundation 
Poland: Hans-Bockler-Stiftung 
South Africa: University of Witwatersrand; University of the Western Cape; Pennsylvania State University; Rod Jones 
Strategic Solutions 
South Korea: Korea Labor Institute; Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies, Cornell University 
Spain: AIRE program (University Rovira & Virgili); CIDEM (Catalan Government) 
Sweden: Scandinavian Center for Call and Contact Services; Swedish Savings Banks Foundation; ISA Invest in Swe 
den Agency; 4BR consultants; Bright verksamhetsutveckling; The Swedish Call Center Association; Mid-Sweden 
University; National Institute for Working Life; KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm 
United Kingdom: Economic and Social Research Council; Russell Sage Foundation; UK Customer Contact Association 
United States: Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; Russell Sage Foundation; Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies, 
Cornell University 
Appendix 
C Survey Methodology, by Countrya 
Estimated 
Estimated 
No. CC all of
Agents Centers CCs in Sample 
Sampling 
Survey Start & Completed Response 
Country (2005) Source of CC Database (2005)Size Str t gy Administration EndDate Surveys Rate H
- HH 
Coordinated Market Ec nomies W 
Austria 40,000 Austrian Call Center 500 
165 
165 All CCs in Telephone 05-07 2005 96 58% ^ 
Forum, ORBAdatabase Q 
database, Internet 
td 
Denmark 23,000 Employers Association, 5  226  AllCCs in Personal cont ct 6-09 2 4 1185%b
phone book, Internet da abase w/ mailresponse [SI 
F ance 210,000 Employers Association, 3,100 90  34Stratifiedandom Telephone 5-082 04 21  6 %^ 
France telecom surveyby sector, S 
subcontactor ^ 
Germany 330,000 Previous databases, , 0  2 80Rand m, plus T lephone 09-145354% O 
Regional 
Development 
added sites ^ 
Agency lists & 
Nether 180,000 Employers Association, 1 500 
800 
800 All CCs in Mail, internet 04-08 2004 118 15% ?g 
-lands related lists da base $ 
O 
Spain 64,000 Telemarketing 1,5224 Al  comp ni s inOn-site, 05,05-01,06 0949% W 
Association, Offi l database telephone, ^ Registry of 
Companies 
postal, email Q
in Spain ( ABI), g Internet, CC mg . Fv
forums H 
Sweden 100,000 EmployersAssociat on, 1,200642 347 A lc mpa ies inMail, w/2-05 2004 161 46%H 
Benchmarking database t lephone, 5 
Company (outsourcing) email, fax hh.
Continued ? }
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C. 
Continued. ^ 
-.-.-.-_-.-.-_-_ QQ 
Estimated 
Estimated 
No. CC No. 
Call 
of No. of 
Agents Centers Cs in Sample ing Surveyta t & o leted Re o s  
Country (2005) Source ofCC Database (2005) Database Size Strategy Administration End Date Surveys Rate 
Liberal Market Economies 
Canada 512,867 Employers Association, 13,42400 All Csin Telephone 02 05?05,06 38777%g 
Internet database q 
Ireland 19,500 Previous list, tel phone 400 287 8All wi h Mail10-120443 %C 
directory, 
Internet, 
confirmed ^
recruitment 
agencies 
contact info. 5d 
Israel 11,000 Telemarketing 500 80 
80 
All CCs in On-site 08-10 2004 80 100% r> 
Association, phone 
database . 
books, 
Internet, 
CC S 
mgr. forums Q 
United 742,000 Employers Association 3,500 500 418All contactableTelephone, w/ 03-1  2 4 167%T 
Kingdom 
companies 
mail follow-up hd 
Uni ed4, 00,000 Du  &Br dstreet, 60, 00 2, 0682Stratified random, T lephone 2- 9 3 46468%O 
States Call enter Magazine by size, cto  ^ 
2 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies S 
Brazil 615,000 Employers Association 1,000 250 250 All CCs in Telephone, 05-09 2005 144 45% h 
database email, on-site, >?i 
India 126,000NAASCOM, Internet, N/A 100 
75 
Non-random i  On-site 07,03?08,04 60 N/A ? 
field research call center citi s C/> 
Poland 8,700 FederalTra e Register 300 11212 AllCCs indat base T lephone 10-11200475 67% ?
South 100 Mu iplindustry, 1,200 1,200 
326 
Non-random in Telephone, 11,02-06,04 64 N/A ^ 
Africa Internet sources 
call 
center cities email, on-site ^ 
South 330,000 Telemarketing 2,500 250 250 All with confirmed On-site, email, 06-09 2004 121 48% 
Korea Association, S. K rea c t ct info. mail 
Mgmt. Association, 
Internet, CC mg . 
forum 
aCopies ofthe International Report (Holman, Batt, and Holtgrewe 2007) and each country report with details of findings and methods are available atwww. 
globalcallcenter.org. 
Appendix 
D Variables Used in 
Papers
this Volume 
Variable Def nition 
HR 8c Work Design Practices 
Compensation 
H 
Annual earnings The gross annual earnings of the typical full-time 
core 
employee before deductions and taxes, including wages, earnings, hh 
bonuses, commissions, profit sharing, and overtime pay; 
but 
excluding benefits such as pensions and health, and deferred 
compensation such as stock options. By "typical" we mean 
that 
about half the core employees are paid more and about half p_i 
are paid less.Allcurrencies w re onvertedtU.S. dollars. Q 
Commission pay Percentage oftotal annual pay bas d n i d vidual i centiv s. S 
Selection 
hh 
N 
Selection rate Per entage of applica ts whog  hi d. J> 
Selection tests Percentage of employees selected using 
systematic 
selection 
tests, for example, psychometric, aptitude, work sampling. ~ 
Training Z 
Initial tra ning No. of days forc ll enter age tsinhrs  year.Js 
Weeks to become competent No.of weeks it takes 
full-time 
agents to become fully competent in their job. Cg 
On-going traini  No. of formal days experienced age tspe  y ar. W
Work design ^ 
Flexible job descriptions Percentage of employees who 
have 
flexible job descriptions notlinked to specific tasks. ^
Flexible work arr ngements Percentage of employees with access to flexible working ar angements, such as job sharing, telecommuting, and flexi-time. g 
Job discretion A s x-item measure concerning the tent  whi h ag ntshav  trol ver o k asknd i t act oni hus o rs. gjj 
It is based on items used in previous call center work 
design 
studies 
(Holman 2002; Wood et al., 2006), and gauged on a five- fr 
point scale that r nges from "notat all" to"agreat d l." The six i ems covered agents' discretion over thefoll wing: daily Q work tasks; methods r procedures s d;speedfwork; customer interaction; setting daily lunch and break schedule; and -} 
handling addit onal requestsor p oblems that ar se unexpectedly. 5
Performa ce monitori g Performance monitori g is a three- temmeasu  c cer ingth  ext n  to whichag ts d t ic lls mon tored ndheq
frequency with which the information gained was fed 
back 
to them. It is based on a measure used by Wood et al. (2006). An Cj 
eight-point scale was used ranging from "never" to 
"daily." 
The ree items concerned how often employees ar  given O
statistical information o  their performance (for 
example, 
number of calls taken, call length, number of sales); how often 3 supervisors or othe  aff list nna regular b sis to thec llfexperienced mp oyees ( hosewithman  y  O tenure); a d how te  an expe ienced mpl yee ec iv s edback dc ach ngo  le hoch qus rv c  ^ 
delivery from a supervisor. 
Teams: Off-line qu lity Perce tage o  employeescurre tly invo ved q alit  i sor p o s/product r v ment t s.
Teams: Self-managed Percentage of employees who 
routinely 
perform their job as part of a self-managed team. 
Continued 4^ 
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Variable Def nition 
Collective 
Representation 
Union coverage A dummy variablerefl cting whether a nter is edby u ct. 
Union ?sf works councils Dummy variables representing 
single 
or combined presence of union agreement/works council. 
Technology 
Automation Percentage of daily customer calls completed by a 
Voice 
Recognition Unit (VRU) orInteractive Voice Response Unit (IVR) ^ 
and that do not 
require 
human i teraction. ?j 
Customer relationship A dummy variable reflecting whether agents use 
CRM systems 
that enable ag nts to alk to the customer while at the same time C^
management searching fo  and ssessrecords fp ior cu to r on acts, lli  i  newu tomer data,n  l ggingi f rmation. ~j Mediabl nding Adu y v riableeflec ing h th ra e tsum dia le i ?a ix urefo i t cwi hc stom rsc udi  2
integrated us  of e-mail, fax, phoneandelect onicc at. ?> 
Web-enablement A dummy variable reflecting whether agents use 
web-enablement 
(joint browsing, chat, instant messaging) when interacting s> 
with customers. 2j 
Workflow management A dummy variablreflectingwheth r l  systemsare us d to to ate his ributio  ofcalls and
flow of tasks, enable skill-based r uting, a d ci itateresourc  planning a d st ff . C 
Work Force 
Characteristics 
q 
Education level Four dummy variables representing the typical 
agent 
education: no formal qualifications, education up to the age of 16, ^ 
education up to the age of 
18, 
and university education. g 
Gender The percentage of female employees. f^ 
No. of employees The log-transform d total number of full-time 
equivalent 
employees (including managers, team leaders, and agents employed H 
(establishment size) on a full-time, part-time, and temporary b sis). Q 
Part-time agents Percentage of 
agents 
hired on a part-time basis. ^
Temporary agents Percentage of agents hired on a temporary b sis either directly orthrough agencies. gd 
Tenure Pe centage of agents with tenure of less than o e year. <* 
Outcomes 
^ 
Call abandonment The log-transformed percentage of 
calls 
that are abandoned by the customer before being answered. 
Labor costsThe tran formed estimate of l  percen age al . 
Dismissal r te The percentage of 
employees 
who were dismissed in the last year. 
Quit rate The log-transformed estimate of the percentage of 
employees 
who voluntarily left their job in the previous year (excluding 
promoti ns, nternal 
transfers, 
dismissals, and retirements). 
Sales change The log-transformed estimate of 
the 
percentage change in sales in the last two years. 
Continued 
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Variable Def nition 
Organizational Characteristics 
Age of callenter in y ars. 
Call type: Inbound A dummy variable reflecting whether 
the 
call center 
primarily deals with inbound or outbound calls. hh 
Operational requirements Th  o e ati al e i e e ts f t  callnter arm asured by sse s ng l tio ship uild ng,extent owhich CSRs W
have rep ated int ractions with customers. I  isa essed on afive-poi tscal  r nging f o  "nev " "v ry ofte .  O
Ownership: In-hou e A dummy variablrefl cting whether the c llc er is n-house oa subc ntractor. Q
Part of larger organization A dummy variable r flecting whether the call center is part of a larger organization or an independent entity. ^ 
Primary activit  A binary variablereflecting whether the c lln e  pr marilyde s iths icoa . kh 
Primary customer segment A ries of d mvari bl s flecting the main yp  of  ved: la gbus essc to ers nly,mall?>
business c tomers only, mass rket a d ll typesf . H 
Sector A dummy variablereflecting the sector ved by cal  nt r.T ewo primary variables us d w ry 
telecommunications and financial servi es.~* 
o 
Use of government prog a s A 5-it m measure of whetherth  callenter us d on  r r  f owing: j br c uit ent a dplacements rvic s, j
location assista ce, incentiv sfor lo ati g  ta ge ed z nes, xb ments, and th r speci ll s r g ts.Thm a ureC/3 
was transformed usi g the n tural log.S 
n w ? z H o G n H I?I o 00 t?? 
Appendix E ? Means and Standard Deviations of Var blesUsed in Thisolume, by Co nt y k>(standard 
deviations 
in parentheses) 
Coordinated Ec nomies LiberalMark tEco omies Emerging Ma k tEconomies 
South South 
Variable Austria Denmark France G nySp in wedenC adIrel nd sraelU.K. S. B zil ndPoAfr cKo eT
HR 8c Work Design Practices 
Compensation t?i 
Annual Ear ings 18,933 42 6 82 1229 56 61301 31949,7  0074,616 2 5057 14811,736 3 6 84 43q 
(U.SJ2005) (10,158) (6,569) (4,577) (9 806(6, 14) (4,628) (9, 1) (9, 6(3, 9 )( ,204) (1 ,964) (3,6 3) (7 2(3 96(5 152(4, 83) (1 ,775) ^
Commission Pay 16.73 9.74 6814.59 2.07 . 4 71.171 .32 .23 1 .01 .776.91 22.07 518.300.81^ 
(% of Total) (24.34) (23.09) (9.93) (15.49) (4.88) (11.17) (18.96) (18.14) ( .52) (7.60) (22.67) (17.11) (12.25) (13.18) (20.29) (20.53) (20.44) 3 
Selection 
*> 
Selection Tests 32.5627.22 5 .740.38 5 9118.53 45 037 386. 4 6 0741.73 9 .4436.  0.524 9 ^ 
(% Use) 45.04) 39 537 456 724 80360 1( . 7)183 281j$ 
Selection Rate (% 27.64 23.30 25.22 22.54 .1915 64 30.03 9 2622. 1.40 7.9434.41 13 21. 8 1. 7 .68.17 O 
of Apps. Hired) (26.77) (23.04) (14.33) (25.89) (31.49) (20. 7) (26.57) (21.13) (23.12) (22.58) (23.07) (23.93) (12.90) (18.62) (24.73) (20.40) (23.97) M 
Training Q3 
Initial Tra ning 18.50 20. 74.8419.5920 22 4. 823 65 0.8418. 7 2 000. 16 16 22.4717. 8 23.254 1.O 
(Days) (17.768 2820 3( 1.405 022 156 699 94 34^ 
On-Going Training 8.65 6.04 6.78 10.92 .537.69 8 7110.13.78 . 010.208.05 1 .271 .30 .84 5. 7 9 65fa
(Days) (8.22) (5.37) (5.15) (10.02) ( 9. 8) (6.63) ( 0.09) ( .15) (5.25) 6 77(1 .23) 4.39)(16.64) 0.29)(10.69) ( 6. 1) ( 0.74) ?
Weeks to Be 11.7916.78 6. 4 6.78 15.615.85 21.33 2 42165.82 7.779.01 314.31 11.70 6.99H 
Proficient (14.26) 5 05123 76 507 8428. ) 9( . 3)17 329 047g 
Work Design Z 
Flexiblejob 27.98 5.8163.45 36.0015 97 8.02 12 47.93 2 213 81.8649.15 95. 3 9w 
Descriptions (42.52) (41.59) (40.55) (46.26) (32.10) (40. )
(2 .70) 
(36.18) 
(42.17) (29.35) (23.51) (16.18) (43.19) (27.34) (37.33) (39.28) g Flexible Work 51.47 25.08.5654.14 1 8849. 5 32 572 .4018. 1 5 233. 92 956 644.489.80 1 .443 9^ 
Arrangements (47.05) 0 2037825 1663 931 13 9744 52 4( .W 
Job Discretion 3.09 3.17 2.85 3.22 3.04 3.06 
2.50 
2.72 2.76 2.58 2.85 2.81 2.04 2.76 3.01 3.17 2.82 ^ 
(0.72) (0.71) 83. 6645878109
Performance 4.30 .264.88 .174 88 .565 31 4. 3 5.0911 . 8906. 9 5.41.67 . 59 
Monitoring (1.62) 38( .7 ) 076494255193
Teams: 35.41 23.2022.66 .79 16. 146.23 5.00 23 51 . 3 .26 .15.29 8 014 . 0 3 . 9.75 3 . 9% Off-line (41.02) (29.70) (32.00) (42.51)( 9.64) (41.71) (39.46) (31.92) ( 5. 4) (3 .33) .71(38.16) 2 8(42. 9) (39.24) ( 5.73) (3 . 1) Teams: 28.54 9 833 97326 1562 438.0  015 2864 8. 67 % Self-Directed (41.18) 39 892 25( .908 73)6672 3450 0247 1
Continued 
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Coordinated Ec nomies Liberal Ma ketEcono ies Emerg ng Ma ke  Ec nomies 
South South 
Variable Austria Denmark France G ny Sp n wedenC adIrel ndsraelU.K.S. B zil ndPola dAfr cKoT a
X 
Collective Representation m 
Union Present 0.20 0.120. 8 . 30.00 0.52.167428.09 . 20.00 823.08 .17Q
(0.40) (0.32) ( .27) (0.18) ( . 0) (0.5 ) ( .37) ( .26) 0(0.45)( .29) (0. 0) ( .27) 43(0.27) ( . ) r1 
Works Council Present 0.14 0.11 0.17 .240.00 0.0028 .19. 0 . 8.00 5.10 .. 8 2
(0.34) 184300.( )5927S 
Union & Works Council 0.36 96221 0048. 31  ) E 
Present (0.48) 920055163. 3N 
Technology 
H 
Call Automation 1.714 48 8 29.3 10.01 351.  6 661 445 55 94 583O 
(9.49) (13.42) (2 .67) (6.49) (10.89) (22.61) (1 .36) ( .10) (15.07) 8.42(2 .15) ( .41)(40.63) ( 5. 7)(1 .92) ( . 9) (23.82) Z
Cust. Relationship 0.45 3561702. 28903O 
Management (0.50) (0.48) ( .50) (0. ) ( .50) (0.25) ( .4 ) (0.42) .50( .45) ( .48) 9( . 0) 49( .43) (0. 5) ( .48) ^E-Mail0 8286891. 6.730 4. 163. 5 .72.520.89730.73 . 8W
(0.38) (0.37) ( .4 ) (0.32) ( .29) (0. 1) ( .44) (0. ) (0.50) 48(0.36) (0.45) 50(0.31) 45(0.45) ( . 2) 
Fax 0.75 0.61 0.72 .860.87 0.87 . 60. 7 8620.91 . 70.09 .83 50. 7 g
(0.44) (0.49) ( . 5) (0.3 ) ( . 4) (0.3 ) ( .43) (0. ) (0. 1) 9.2(0.47) 29(0.38) 45(0.44) ( . 2) frj
Media Bl nding 0.25 .0  0 27.82 0 0411. 90.004.  7. 1^ 
(0.44) (0.23) ( . 4) (0.38) ( .21) (0.32) 2950(0. 0) (0.43) 0( . 5) 0 41Q
Voice Recognition 0.080.01 0.15 .08.38 .028 143.07 .10.09 130. 9 .
(0.28) 103649. 57( ) 40?? 
Web-Enablement 0.22 0.13 0. 4 .300.13 . 10. 8 17250.23 .560.62 0. 0 6.15 .39. 4 ?
(0.42) (0.34) ( .43) (0. 6) ( .34) (0. 1) ( . 9) (0. 8) (0. 4) 2(0.50) (0. 9) 7(0. 8) 37(0.49) ( . 8) H
Workflow Management 0.41 0.12 0.25 .430.19 .0436 0.45 . 30.52 .09 7120.88 .35
(0.49) 3245021857. )3g 
Call enter Ou comes 5 
o 
Average Call Time 160 150 180 195 180 242186 24073 0 18  50195 H
(Median) (191) (114) (133) ( 24)( 65) ( 2)( 85)3( 8)5  (179) 01(249) (12 )( 45) ( 0163) g
Call Abandon Rate 6.716.36 6. 0 .533.46 6.294 47 5.8245. 3 4.12.56 .56 5 625. 97.8. 6 
(6.45) (7.65) (4.00) (5. 5) (2.74) (5.86) ( .72) (5.34) (7.53) .29( .66) (4. 8) 2 53( . 4) 23(10.70) (8.0 ) 
Dismissal Rate 1.205.011.94 5 461.68 3 316. 99  8 4038. 6 12.40 4.30 5 58.3 3 .
(2.39) 9 124 510.40) 9478673. )5 82 126 50  
Labor Costs (% of T tal)71.49 0 56772 113 846 . 08 9507 204 359 34
(15.86) 20 158.15) 66 01 2249 8( 8. )2 7914734
Continued Oo 
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Coordinated Ec nomies Liberal Ma ketEcono ies Emerg ng Ma ke  Ec nomies 
South South 
Variable Austria Denmark France G nySp in wedenC adIrel nd s elU.K.S. B zil nd a Pola dfr caKo eT t
Quit Rate(%/Yr.) 3.85 8.88 9.60 5.10 1 .38 5.61 4 14 7.80 2 3315. 9 12.88 9.1  3.31 9.62.41 8.1.71 
(7.12) (12.15) 609.72) 21. 9)8.658 441874 80 7  25
Sales Change (%) 12.00 36 237 9725 41 49 589.46 0 894 18.7 2_<
(32.11) 6 34 426 695 95 347 2781 09 562 7( 37. ) 150 0^ 
o 
Work Force 
Characteristics 
?* 
Agent Education 
(Typical Worker 
inCall Center) ?_j 
Education: 0.76 110580233744. 98g 
To Age 16(0.43) 31( .22)01895057  5 
Education: 0.13 0.81 0.29 0.20 0.53 0.65 0.83 
0.23 
0.53 0.29 0.40 0.22 0.28 0.75 0.11 0.68 0.45 ^ 
To Age 18(0.33) 9( .46) 05875241? 
Education: 0.11 0866352934072Q 
University (0.32) (0.27) (0.48) (0.08) ( .4 ) (0. 5) ( .34) ( .49) 0 2(0. 5) 1(0.00) .45(0.44)( . 3) (0.39) ( . 2) hh Female: % 75.96 68.2070. 9 3.8376 0 .3169 19 6. 47 .578 45 66.23 4 . 40.59 819.1g 
(19.41) 20 572 6908 23614 437 8356 71 5g 
Part-Time: % 28.681 077.48 48 116 1294 633074377 0^3
(33.84) (27.76) (17.94) (26.96) (17.98) (24.86) (26.67) (16.95) (45.25) (20.12)(26.61) (34.77) (6.36) ( .11) ( 8.39) (7.93) (28.21) g 
Temps. % 2.86 8 000. 0 17 744 56 857 319022426361 4E 
(9.98) (13.86) (28.29) (24.62) (38.4 ) ( 5. 6) ( 5.55) (22.94) (0.00) (23.58) (21.28) (21.01) (0.00) (34.17) (10.87) (41.93) (25.81) ^> 
Tenure (%< lYr) 10.22 30.74 23.51 27.25 37.25 6.98 27.85 
33.86 
29.17 29.90 24.69 38.26 57.49 43.21 22.97 38.29 28.24 ?h 
(14.71) (29.6 ) (2 .2 ) (28.6 ) (31.94) (20.96) (26.33) (26. 7) (24. 9) (23.00) (22.46) (28.0 ) (23.59) (3 .05) (23.29) (28.11) (26.41) O 
z 
Organizational and 
Market 
Characteristics (/) 
Age of Center (M an) 9.99087 76 611.01 1340 56745 38 35S 
(9.25) (9.48) (6. 2) (5. 4) ( .10) (8. 9) (9. 1) (7.55) ( 1.95) (8.37)( .37) ( . ) (2 19( 88(4 92(3.89) (9.74) 
Age of Center (Median) 7.00 6.00 8.00 6.00 6.00 9.00 
8.00 
9.00 8.00 7.00 12.00 6.00 4.00 5.00 7.00 5.00 7.00 ?^j 
Gov't Program Use: 1.781.38 1.65 1.72 2.07 1.75 1.64 2.091.35 .821.41 1. 1 1.65 .04 .36 .6^
Ave. No. (0.54) 8( .70)9579246136  
Inbound Centers (%) 0.61 8072.768954
(0.49) 307( . 8321565
In-House Center  (%) 0.63 .70. 1 . 3 0.50.76 0.53 .810. 8 730.86 .47 0 20.57. 0. 2 7
(0.49) 5( . 7) 503310 4
Managers: % of Work 14.9412.4714.20 14.62 3.891 .25 11. 9 5 635.79.644. 1 9 458 791 .69 16.42 1.5913.  
Force (Mean) 12.50) 1 1182049.24) 304 296 9(8 475 33
Continued 
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Coordinated Ec nomies Liberal Ma ketEcono ies Emerg ngMa ke  Ec nomies 
South South 
Variable Austria Denmark France G nySp in wedenC adIrel nd sraelU.K.S. B zil ndPol dfriKoreT
H X 
Managers: % of Work hrj 
Force (Median) 13.03 6.09 6 221 .97 14.838 88 56.8.40 .37 12.48 .8  4 331 .78 10.48 10.05 10.19 ~
Operational Requirements 2.75 3.00 2.50 2.85 3.06 
3.21 
3.03 3.21 2.94 3.01 2.71 3.23 2.98 3.49 3.56 2.81 2.94 f* 
(1.16) (0.89) (1.03) ( .05) (0. 4) ( .95) (1.13) ( .89) (1.17) ( .01)( .31) ( .91) ( . 2) (0.98) ( .10) ( .09) ( .12) O 
Partof La ger .86 0.86 0.76 0.730.82 0.74 0.81 0.98 0.96 0. 7 0. 0 0.66 0.32 0.79 0.41 .87 0.76 *>
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